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made, forcing a probably dependent beneficiary to pay premiums for the balance of the
insured's life expectancy is a material change in the value of the promised benefit.
Modern Woodoen v. White, 70 Colo. 207, 199 Pac. 965 (1921); Roblin v. Supreme Tent,
269 Pa. 139, 112 Atl. 70 (1920); Fryerv. Modern Woodmen, 179 N.W. 16o (Iowa 1920);
Sweet v. Modern Woodmen, 169 Wis. 462, 172 N.W. 143 (1919).
The instant case joins a small minority in finding the by-law reasonable on the
practical basis that in the large percentage of the "disappearance" cases the insured
is in fact alive and the member is either attempting to defraud the insurance company
or has deserted his family. Steen v. Modern Woodmen, 296 Ill. 104, 129 N.E. 546 (1921);
.lf cGovern v. Brotlrhoodof Locomotive Firemenand Engineers,31 Ohio C. C. 243 (19o9)
aff'd, 85 Ohio 460, 98 N.E. 1128 (1911). This is especially true of mutual companies
where many members are migratory workmen. The insurance is against death not
desertion. These courts point out that disappearance does not have the same value in
indicating death as it did when the presumption was formulated because then travel
was hazardous. Excellent communication and police records render unlikely actual
death being uncommunicated. These factors have led to a weakening of the presumption of death in at least one state. In New York it is now necessary to prove that
death was the "probable cause" of uncommunicated absence before the presumption
can be invoked. See Butler v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 197, 121 N.E. 758 (1919).
Seemingly, therefore, in spite of the present weight of authority, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to say that future retroactive by-laws like the one in the
principal case were not reasonably within the intention of the parties.

Mortgages-Effect of Appointment of Rent Receiver on Existing Leases-[Illinois].
-The plaintiff, who had been appointed receiver to collect rents on the mortgagee's
behalf pending foreclosure, sued a tenant to compel payment of rent under a lease
made with the mortgagor subsequent to the mortgage and without the mortgagee's
consent. The tenant contended that the appointment of the receiver terminated the
lease. Held, for the plaintiff. The appointment of a receiver constitutes taking of
possession by the court, not by the mortgagee, and does not constitute an eviction.
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Gordon, No. 38867, not yet reported (Ill. App. 1936).
The instant case is the first Illinois decision on the point. For a thorough discussion
of the problem, see Teft, Receivers and Leases Subordinate to the Mortgage, 2 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 33 (1934).

Patents-Applicability of Notice Provision to Non-manufacturing Patentees[United States].-In a suit by the plaintiff for patent infringement, the defendant
counterclaimed for infringement of its patent. The defendant had not manufactured
the patented article and had not given the plaintiff any notice of the patent until the
filing of the counterclaim. Section 4900 of the Revised Statutes provides: "It shall be
the duty of all patentees .... and all persons making or vending any patented article
that the same is patented ....
by fixing thereon
.... to give sufficient notice ....
the word 'patented.'" It further provides that anyparty "failing so to mark" shall recover damages for only those infringements occurring after notice. R. S. § 4900, 35
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(1929). From a judgment of the circuit court of appeals, denying the
defendant's claim for damages for infringements prior to the filing of the counterclaim,
the defendant appealed. Held, reversed. Section 4900 does not apply to non-manufacturing patentees; the defendant may recover for infringements taking place both before
and after notice given by the filing of the counterclaim. Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v.
Enterprise Ry. Equipment Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 528 (1936).
By the decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court has resolved a long standing
ambiguity in section 4900 which has given rise to a sharp conflict in the decisions of
lower federal courts. On the ground that the words "it shall be the duty of all patentees"
clearly include non-manufacturing patentees, courts have reached a result contrary to
the instant decision and non-manufacturing patentees have been required to give
actual notice as a condition precedent to recovery for infringement. Son v. Pressed
Steel Car Co., 21 F. (2d) 528 (D.C. N.Y. 1927); American Caramel Co. v. Thomas Mills
and Bro., 162 Fed. 147 (C.C.A. 3d 19o7); ChurchwardInternationalSteel Co. v. Betlde-

U.S.C.A. § 49

heem Steel Co., 262 Fed. 438 (D.C. Pa. 1919); FlatSlab Patents Co. v. Northwestern Glass
Co., 281 Fed. 51 (C.C.A. 8th 1922); Van Meter v. U.S., 47 F. (2d) 192 (C.C.A. 2d
1931). Other courts, however, have urged, as did the Supreme Court here, that the
words "failing so to mark" imply the existence of an opportunity to mark. Olsson v.
U.S., 72 Ct. Cl. 72, 102 (1931); Wagner v. Corn Products Refining Co., 28 F. (2d) 617,
638 (D.C. N.J. 1928). Since manufacturing patentees alone have the opportunity to
mark, the words "all patentees" have been limited to exclude non-manufacturing
patentees. Olsson v. U.S., 72 Ct. Cl. 72, 104 (1931); Campbell v. City of N.Y., 81 Fed.
182, 184 (C.C. N.Y. 1897); Ewart Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin Cycle-Chain Co., 91 Fed. 262
(C.C. Mass. 1898). Most of these decisions rest on or refer to Dunlap v. Schofield, 152
U.S. 244 (1893). However, this case is not in point because it involved a manufacturing patentee who failed to mark. See Curtis, The Marking of Patented Articles, 21
Col. L. Rev. 305, 31o (I921). Section 4900 has also been held inapplicable to manufacturers using process patenis. U.S. Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 Fed. 206 (C.C.
Pa. 1898); Wagner v. Corn Products Refining Co., 28 F. (2d) 617 (D.C. N.J. 1928). See
77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 704 (1929). But these decisions can be distinguished from the
instant case since the inability to give notice of a patented process by marking is due
to the nature of the patented subject matter rather than the failure of the patentee to
use the subject matter of the patent.
The decision in the instant case is unfortunate because it defeats the purpose of
section 49oo. The patent records often afford inadequate notice to prospective manufacturers and section 4900 was designed to give a fair warning to them by requiring
marking or giving of actual notice, at least, by manufacturing patentees. Since the
need for notice on the part of the prospective manufacturer is not reduced by the fact
that the patentee has failed to manufacture, it is not reasonable to suppose that the
legislature intended to exempt a non-manufacturing patentee from the notice requirement. It is of course true that a non-manufacturing, as distinguished from a manufacturing, patentee has had no opportunity to give notice by marking. But since the ultimate purpose of patent law is to increase the supply of useful articles by rewarding
inventiveness, it is socially desirable to encourage the manufacture by patentees. 33
Law Notes IO5 (1929); 9 Conn. B. J. 140 (1935). To allow damages only for infringements occurring after manufacture or notice might stimulate patentees to manufac-

ture.
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Practice-Appeal by Defendant to Whom New Trial Has Been Granted-[Ohio].The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's testimony and
at the close of the entire evidence. Both motions were overruled and a verdict returned
for plaintiff by the jury. The defendant then moved for judgment and for a new trial.
The defendant's motion for judgment was overruled but his motion for a new trial was
granted, on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. No
judgment was at any time rendered for either party in the trial court. The defendant
appealed, citing as error the overruling of his motions for a directed verdict and for
judgment after verdict. Held (one judge dissenting), the order granting a new trial
was a final order which would support an appeal from errors in the trial by the defendant to whom it was granted. Michigan-Ohio-Indiana Coal Ass'n v.Nigh, 131
Ohio St. 405, 3 N.E. (2d) 355 (1936).

The statement of the dissenting judge that an order granting a new trial was not a
final order sufficient to support an appeal was in accord with earlier Ohio decisions and
with decisions of other jurisdictions. Continental Trust Co. v. Home Fuel & Supply Co.,
99 Ohio St. 453, 126 N.E. 5o8 (igig); Huff v. PennsylvaniaR.R. Co., 127 Ohio St. 94,
187 N.E. i (i933); Hunt v. United States, 53 F. (2d) 333 (C.C.A. ioth 1931). But two
recent Ohio per curiam decisions held an order granting a new trial a final order.
Hocking Valley Mining Co. v. Hunter, 130 Ohio St. 333, 199 N.E. 184 (i935); CincinnatiGoodwill Industries v. Neuerman, 13o Ohio St. 334, i99 N.E. 178 (1935). See also Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1935, c. I10, § 201, Ill. C. P. A. 1933, § 77.
The court in the principal case insisted that granting a new trial to the defendant
should not preclude him from appealing from the overruling of his motion for a
directed verdict. The objection to allowing such appeal by the defendant after he has
moved for and obtained a new trial is that he is thereby afforded too great an opportunity to delay action in the case without any detriment other than the costs of appeal.
And by so delaying he may force the plaintiff to accept a relatively unfavorable settlement.
Where an order granting a new trial is not a final order, it is clear that no appeal can
be taken from error in the trial by the party to whom a new trial is granted. Bloomberg v. Bloomberg, 148 Wash. 638, 269 Pac. 852 (1928); Wolfe v. City of Miami, 1r4 Fla.
238, 54 So. i96 (1934). In Iowa the appellate court (on an appeal raising the sufficiency of the evidence) usually remands for a new trial only, even though it feels that
the trial court should have directed a verdict or given final judgment. i Iowa Bar
Rev. 57 (i935). And in the federal courts, the jury's return of a verdict for one party
precludes the entry of a final judgment for the other party even though the court admits that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Slocum v. New York
L. Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913); cf. Baltimore v. Rediman, 295 U.S. 654 (i935); see also
Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts, rule 56 (prelim. draft 1936). Again
while a statute seems to provide for final judgment on appeal from the granting of a
new trial, Pennsylvania courts have been very reluctant to upset the ruling granting
a new trial. See Purdon's Penn. Stats. 1931, tit. 12, § 682; March v. PhiladelphiaCo.,
285 Pa. 413, 132 Adt. 355 (1926).
The Indiana courts have suggested that the defendant in moving for a new trial has
elected not to pursue his remedy for the overruling of his motion for judgment non
obstante veredicto. See Lousiville Ry. Co. v. Miller, 141 Ind. 533, 37 N.E. 343 (1894);
King v. Inlanu Steel Co., 177 Ind. 201, 96 N.E. 337 (igii); Evansville Ry. Co. v. Cook-

